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ABSTRACT 
The basis for current design provisions intended to ensure adequate Robustness in building structures e.g. those 
of the Eurocode and similar North American documents, is discussed and their limitations identified. In 
particular, the often tenuous link between the concepts employed and behaviour observed in actual incidents is 
highlighted. It is contended that research in the subject - particularly that completed within the past few years - 
provides sufficient understanding that - at least for some forms of construction - a scientifically more soundly 
based approach is now appropriate. Such an approach would fit naturally within the ethos of Performance 
Based.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Structural design seeks to ensure that before a structure is built an assessment has been made to check that it can 
be expected to perform adequately. Over time the basis for how this is done has changed significantly: from 
mimicking nature, trial and error and observing precedent through increasingly more scientifically based 
thinking to our latest conceptual framework of Performance Based. At the highest level this is a delightfully but 
deceptively simple concept: define what is required and then engineer the structure so that it delivers this 
performance. But defining acceptable performance and specifying how it should be demonstrated are hard 
challenges, particularly if every structure is required to be treated individually within its own context. 
It is for this reason, as well as because of concerns over public safety and legal liability, that our present 
generation of Structural Codes based on Limit States principles essentially define the conditions that should be 
met and provide ( in more or less detail ) procedures for checking and demonstrating that this is the case. Where 
departures from this practice have occurred e.g. the original thinking that the Structural Eurocodes (Breitschaft, 
Oestlund and Kersken-Bradley 1992) should focus on Principles with limited concern for Application Rules or 
the treatment of serviceability defections for portal frames in the first version of the British Code for Steel 
Buildings, BS 5950 (BSI 1990) as a matter to be agreed with the client on the basis of the particular 
arrangements, the situation has subsequently changed e.g. the current focus for the Evolution of the second 
generation of Structural Eurocodes is on usability whilst the first revision to BS 5950 saw the inclusion of 
specific default deflection limits. 
Largely as a result of public concern arising from a few spectacular and widely publicised collapses, the 
provision of sufficient resilience that, should a structure suffer an incident that has not been allowed for 
explicitly in its design its functionality should not be unduly impaired, now features more prominently in the 
thinking of clients, insurers, regulatory authorities and construction professionals. But how should this be 
treated? With prescriptive rules or general principles? Should Codes provide the means to demonstrate adequacy 
or just set out the requirements to be met? How should these be framed - as general objectives or in terms of 
specific limits? What is the scientific and evidential basis for making specific provisions? Noting that the most 
significant event in this field, the progressive collapse due to a localised gas explosion of one corner of the 22 
storey Ronan Point apartment building, occurred almost 50 years ago (Griffiths, Pugsley and Saunders 1968) it 
is considered appropriate to review the subject with the aim of assessing the adequacy of current provisions, the 
information and understanding currently available on which something different might be based and the 
possibilities for improved treatments. This is done herein from the particular perspective of Robustness, a 
property that is defined and explained below, focussing on the performance of multi-storey steel and composite 
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frame building structures subject to an initial incident with the potential to trigger a Progressive Collapse form 
of failure (Staroussek 2009). 
THE CONCEPT OF ROBUSTNESS 
Robustness is an inherent feature of a structure. It has been defined in many places; (Haberland and Starossek 
2009); that used herein is: 
Robustness in a structure ensures that the consequences of sustaining some limited damage will not be 
disproportionate to the event that caused the initial damage. 
Thus it can be associated with a specific event e.g. accommodating the failure of one or more cables in a cable 
stayed bridge, or it can be used as a more generic indication of adequacy e.g. better response to an unforeseen 
event. A particularly simple definition is: the ability of the structure to 'take a knock'. 
Disproportionate collapse - the condition that the possession of adequate robustness is intended to prevent - 
occurs when a local failure spreads throughout the structure in such a way that a partial or complete collapse 
occurs. Well known incidents include the collapse of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre (FEMA 2002) 
illustrated in Figure 1 as a result of aircraft impact and the collapse of one corner of the Ronan Point apartment 
building (Griffiths, Pugsley and Saunders 1968) shown in Figure 2 as a result of a gas explosion. In both cases 
an event occurred essentially on a single floor yet its influence spread in such a way that the consequences could 
be said to be disproportionate to the initial incident. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                            Figure 1 WTC                                                                     Figure 2 Ronan Point 
Derivation of a suitable design approach to Robustness or to lessen the likelihood of Disproportionate Collapse 
or to reduce the possibility of a Progressive Collapse ( the particular form of spectacular collapse witnessed in 
full or partial form respectively for the WTC towers and for Ronan Point, in which the structure collapses under 
its own weight in a pancake mode ) is complicated by its being a low probability but high consequences type of 
event i.e. there will be few instances of actual progressive collapses and, thus relatively little observed behaviour 
from which to develop an understanding of the governing features and still less to use in any statistically based 
approach. 
As a result a series of somewhat indirect design approaches have emerged e.g. key elements, tying capacity and 
alternate load path as illustrated in Figures. 3-5. Although the mechanics of implementation have changed and 
some research data directly related to the subject area has emerged, the essence of these approaches is not very 
different from that which resulted from the findings of the Report into the Ronan Point collapse (Griffiths, 
Pugsley and Saunders 1968) that was published almost 50 years ago. Given the developments in Structural 
Engineering over that period e.g. the widespread use of computer analysis, emergence of the Finite Element 
Method, adoption of the Limit States Design philosophy etc., it is surprising that more scientific approaches to 
Robustness have not been embraced.  
The reality is, of course, that there have been developments and there have been proposals but these have not 
really resulted in much change in design practice. Why is this? Partly, because the topic is inherently very 
complex and designers prefer simple, straightforward tools. Partly, because of concerns that complex and time 
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consuming procedures should not be imposed on the profession unless the need can be clearly demonstrated - 
even post Ronan Point few countries had any national provisions addressing Robustness, although the publicity 
associated with the high profile WTC collapses certainly prompted some change of attitude. Partly, because 
researchers have not been able to distill their findings into suitably attractive design methods. 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
        Figure 3 Key Elements                                                           Figure 4 Tying Capacity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Alternate load path 
It is argued herein that the subject is now sufficiently mature, with adequate understanding of the controlling 
features, that it is time for a more scientific approach. This is not to say that complex calculation methods should 
become the norm, nor that every structure should be required to include Progressive Collapse in its design 
requirements. Rather it is about recognising an imbalance in our present arrangements, with an inevitable 
tendency to focus on that with which we are comfortable and for which we have plenty of tools available, whilst 
continuing to treat Robustness as something of an afterthought. There is an interesting and highly relevant 
precedent here: the move from fire protection to fire engineering for steel and composite buildings. As a result 
of actual incidents that suggested that the performance of unprotected steelwork might be significantly better 
than that indicated by standard fire tests on individual components, the concept of assessing the fire loading and 
then checking in a quantitative fashion the ability of the complete structure to behave in an acceptable fashion 
for a suitable time has now become established to the extent that 'Fire design' is often an integral part of the 
overall structural consideration - in much the same way that design for wind loading and foundation design are 
treated. 
ROBUSTNESS AS A STRUCTURAL DESIGN PROPERTY 
Robustness is most often regarded as a property of the structure, with typical questions being: 'Has robustness 
been checked?' or 'Does the structure possess sufficient robustness?' When posing such questions an important 
aspect is whether they need to be answered within the context of their being threat dependant or threat 
independent. For the former it is presumed that the specific design requirement can be defined in terms that 
would permit a customised design approach to be devised e.g. an explosion caused by a specific type of device 
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placed at a specific location, with the design requirement being that only limited damage be caused and the 
resulting modified structure be able to deliver a specific level of performance in its new condition. Such a 
situation is not the main concern of this paper. Threat independent means that the specific triggering action is 
not known but that the client wishes their structure to have some degree of inherent resilience should an 
unforeseen event occur. Specification of particular tying capabilities in connections intended to ensure that they 
could facilitate the development of catenary action or designating certain components as 'key elements' and then 
proportioning them to have a greater margin against conventional failure come within this category. Their 
inherent weakness is that they are not linked to the behaviour of the structure should it suffer a triggering event 
in the sense that a statement of the form: 'As a result of doing x this arrangement will be y times safer than the 
original scheme', cannot be made. Nor is it possible to make quantitative comparisons in terms of outcome 
between alternative possible solutions. Thus the important skill of a structural designer viz. to use their 
judgement based on the combination of experience and understanding informed by calculation to make 
decisions on satisfying the problem constraints, cannot be properly exercised. Essentially, the approaches are of 
the pass/fail type using arbitrary criteria. 
 
When dealing with Robustness it is helpful to recall the often stated (or, more likely, implied) questions that 
designers should ask of their clients:  
How safe do you want to be? 
How confident do you want to be that you have achieved this level of safety? 
 
Full answers do, of course, require consideration of what individuals and society will tolerate as well as some 
recourse to statistical treatments. The former is complicated by the subjective and emotive element, whilst the 
latter is made difficult by the nature of the data available for low probability but high consequences events. For 
example, Table 1, which was prepared some years ago for the UK's Standing Committee on Structural Safety (a 
body formed in the aftermath of Ronan Point, whose role is to identify features and developments in 
Construction with the potential to have adverse effects on the safety of structures) contrasts the extremely low 
chance of death by structural collapse compared with many everyday or hazardous activities. Given that a 
disproportionate collapse caused by insufficient robustness would also involve an unusual triggering event, what 
level should be adopted? It is a question that I shall leave to others. 
Table 1 Relative cost of death in UK by activity 
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RESEARCH INTO STRUCTURAL ROBUSTNESS 
As is the case for any topic, identifying the first pieces of research is difficult - partly because later work often 
illustrates how something done earlier in a different context actually has relevance to the topic in hand. Based on 
the presumption that those responsible for compiling the Ronan Point Report will have made strenuous efforts to 
identify anything that might have been helpful to them, it would appear that very little existed back in the 1960s. 
Interestingly, in a paper presented at the first Structural Engineers World Congress (SEWC), that took place in 
San Francisco in 1997, Bruce Ellingwood stated: 'There is currently a virtual absence of research activity or 
interest in the United States in the topic'. This situation contrasts sharply with the position today when each of 
the main structural journals e.g. Engineering Structures, Journal of Constructional Steel Research, ASCE 
Journal of Structural Engineering etc., regularly contain papers with Robustness, Progressive Collapse or 
Disproportionate Collapse in their titles. Figure  6 charts the growth in these papers across the whole publication 
database; 50% of these papers have been published in the past 5 years. 
 
Figure 6 Growth of papers on robustness 
Research in the subject area has taken several different forms: 
1 Conceptual or philosophical studies on the Vulnerability of structures. 
2 Risk and probability studies aimed at deciding how the topic should be treated. 
3 FE studies using sophisticated modelling to try to replicate the physically important features of a 
progressive collapse. 
4 Experimental work on connections to assess their ability to perform adequately under the conditions 
experienced during a progressive collapse. 
5 Modelling of connection behaviour for inclusion in analyses of overall response. 
6 Experimental work designed to replicate the behaviour of part of a structure as progressive collapse is 
induced. 
7 Simplified analysis intended to cover all the main features but without the explicit modelling of each. 
Unsurprisingly, coverage of the subject is patchy with considerable progress having been made in certain areas 
e.g. large scale FE simulations, and comparatively little real progress in others e.g. laboratory tests to investigate 
connection response under the specific conditions experienced during progressive collapse. Equally 
unsurprisingly the actual value of the contributions varies, with some being focussed on providing clear insight 
into an important feature and others being somewhat superficial e.g. FE analyses with no clear idea of what 
constitutes failure. However, taken together there is no doubt that far more is known about the mechanics of the 
subject, the relative importance of different physical features and which parameters to address in order to effect 
improvements than was the case 25 years ago. Complications arise because certain effects only become 
significant for particular combinations of circumstances e.g. whilst catenary action is clearly a potentially 
important resistance mechanism it cannot be achieved unless the structure - particularly its connections - 
possesses sufficient ductility that this phase can be mobilised. In some cases it has been found that practices 
adopted to address other concerns actually have a negative impact on robustness e.g. structurally isolating corner 
columns in frames designed to withstand seismic action. Thus, although behaviour is governed by the 'eternal 
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truths' of Structural Engineering of strength, stiffness and ductility, because of the complex interplay of these 
properties in any given situation it has not been possible to provide simple yet generally applicable guidance. 
BASIC FEATURES OF PROGRESSIVE COLLAPSE AND POTENTIAL DESIGN APPROACHES 
When dealing with the particular case of providing Robustness in a multi-storey frame building so as to limit the 
likelihood of a progressive collapse should a local triggering event occur, identification of the basic mechanics 
is the first requirement. Careful examination of actual occurrences (Starossek 2009; FEMA 2002) together with 
consideration of related situations e.g. bomb damaged buildings from World War Two (ICE 1948), aircraft 
impact on the Empire State Building (Levy and Salvadori 1992) performance in earthquakes (Scawthorn and 
Chen 2002) as well as fundamental structural thinking has led to the identification of the key features as: 
x The actual collapse occurs rapidly and is, therefore, a dynamic event. 
x It involves the structure undergoing gross deformations. 
x Inelastic behaviour of the material of the components will occur. 
x Key to the containment of the triggering incident is the avoidance of separation. 
x Members and connections directly involved in the damaged regions will be subject to very different 
loading demands from those experienced under normal loading cases. 
Thus neither the concept of 'key elements', in which certain structural members, whose involvement in the 
structural system is judged to be particularly important, are proportioned more conservatively, nor that of 'tying 
forces', in which tensile resistance is provided in the beam to column connections so that beams can act in a 
catenary fashion, directly address the actual mechanics of Progressive Collapse. The former is only really a 
'comfort mechanism' since there is no link between the increased resistance provided in certain members and 
improved capability to resist Progressive Collapse. Although catenary action can contribute to resisting a 
Progressive Collapse it can only be mobilised after very large beam deformations - typically of the order of one 
to two times the beam depth - have developed, something that is unlikely to occur in many cases due to there 
being insufficient ductility available in the beam to column connections. Thus neither approach links directly to 
the concept of the performance of the structure in the actual situation being addressed. 
The other design concept to emerge in the aftermath of the Ronan Point Investigation was 'alternate load path', 
in which one or more elements of the structure are removed and the ability of the damaged structure to 
redistribute loads, to adopt a new equilibrium position and to remain stable is assessed in a quantitative fashion. 
In their description of the aircraft impact on the Empire State Building, Levy and Salvadori (Levy and Salvadori 
1992) liken this to a centipede losing a couple of legs but being able to adjust and compensate for the loss, the 
opposite would be the flamingo standing on one leg! 
 Since its emergence the 'alternate load path' concept has been subject to considerable study and development 
and features explicitly in both the most recent North American (GSA 2003; GSA 2013; DOD 2013) and 
European (BSI 2014) Code provisions. However, guidance on exactly how it should be implemented is, at best, 
unclear and, in places unhelpful. Central to this is the need to define the criterion of failure or the actual level of 
performance to be designed for. Having note to the characteristics of Progressive Collapse identified in the 
above list, it should be clear that stress limitations or deflection limits cannot represent the true objective. This 
can only be defined as separation of the elements such that the collapse can propagate. Since the most likely 
location for such separation is the connections, the ability of the beam to column connections to resist the 
conditions imposed by the grossly deformed damaged structure becomes the crucial consideration.  
Another important consideration is the nature of the initial triggering event. This can either be defined e.g. a 
specific charge detonated at a specific location within the structure, or unknown as in the need to 'provide 
sufficient robustness'. These two cases are normally referred to as 'threat dependant' and 'threat independent' 
respectively. In the threat dependant case the designer should treat the issue as an additional load case and make 
suitable provision. By its nature 'threat independent' does not prescribe the actual triggering incident so, for 
design purposes, something has to be defined. The situation is, therefore, similar to the 'three second gust' or the 
'standard fire' in that a representative (some might say arbitrary or even artificial) case is specified. For 
robustness and progressive collapse this is the 'column removal' scenario, in which a single column is assumed 
to be instantaneously removed and the ability of the remaining structure to bridge over the gap, as illustrated in 
Figure 7, examined. 
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Figure 7 Column removal 
THE ALTERNATE LOAD PATH APPROACH 
Figure 8 shows how the alternate load path concept may be employed at the structure, substructure, floor, floor 
grillage or beam level. A single column is selected for removal and the response of the remaining structure is 
then analysed. It is essential that this analysis is capable of representing all important physical features and that 
it includes a realistic criterion of failure. Clearly a nonlinear dynamic Finite Element analysis that incorporates 
connection behaviour should be capable of doing this but such an approach requires both an understanding of all 
the complexities involved and the necessarily large computing facilities needed to run very big analyses.  
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 8 Frame to beam substructuring 
Thus it can hardly be regarded as an approach suitable for routine use. It is for this reason that the group at 
Imperial College London has spent many years developing its Robustness Assessment Framework, in which all 
important features are allowed for but without the need for their explicit and computationally very demanding 
fundamental treatment. Key features of the Framework are: 
x Only static analysis is required, dynamics being incorporated through the concept of energy balance. 
x The actual analysis may be conducted using any suitable software, alternatively an enhanced slope 
deflection method that permits very rapid calculation using a spreadsheet may be used. 
x Quantitative comparisons between alternatives may readily be made. 
x The steps involved are very similar to those used for conventional structural design. 
x Failure is defined in terms of the available connection ductility under the loading experienced at gross 
deformation. 
x If suitable analysis software is available then potentially beneficial features such as the influence of 
floor slabs and cladding can be incorporated. 
Full details are available in a series of PhD theses, of which the most significant for design are: 
x Vlassis 2007 - basic framework and methodology (Vlassis 2007). 
x Styllianidis 2011 - simplified calculation method and examination of importance of different features 
(Styllianidis 2011). 
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x Vidalis 2014 - design strategy, including consideration of frames designed for seismic conditions 
(Vidalis 2014). 
Figures 9-11 illustrate three important features of the approach: the 'conversion' of the results from a static 
analysis into a pseudo static analysis, the stages through which a beam undergoing gross deformation passes and 
the loading experienced by a beam to column connection during the development of these gross deformations. 
The first considerably simplifies the approach, whilst the other two provide the key to understanding the 
mechanics. Using this knowledge and based on the appraisal of many hundreds of different examples a strategy 
for addressing design to resist progressive collapse has been devised (Vidalis and Nethercot 2014). This respects 
the practical limitations associated with the reality that this aspect of the design will normally be undertaken 
once the majority of the 'conventional design' has been completed so that only certain options will be open e.g. 
whilst modifications to connection details remain possible, altering the grid spacing is unlikely to be feasible. 
 
 
Figure 9 Simplified dynamic response assessment and definitiion of pseudo-static response 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
     Figure 10 Beam nonlinear static load-deflection       Figure 11 Beam axial load-connection 
                 bending moment interaction 
          
PERFORMANCE BASED DESIGN 
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Adopting a Performance Based approach to design for Robustness first requires that the required level of 
performance be defined. For Robustness within the context of the avoidance of Progressive Collapse this should 
be the ability of the damaged structure to assume a new stable equilibrium position. This is most readily 
characterised by the avoidance of separation at the connections. This may, in turn, be defined in terms of the 
deformation limits for key connection components based on the realistic appraisal of connection behaviour 
under the conditions experienced during a progressive collapse. The demands on the connections should be 
assessed by a suitable analysis of the damaged structure. Given that the general requirement is that this be 
conducted for the threat independent condition, the well established conventional 'test' is removal of a single 
column; this may be implemented using a variety of different column positions since response in the case of 
(say) removal of a corner column will be different from that for an edge or internal column removal. The 
analysis may use any approach that allows for all the key effects and should also make allowance for the 
dynamic nature of the event. By adopting an energy balance approach the need to conduct a dynamic analysis 
may be replaced by a much simpler static analysis. Whilst any other method of converting the results from a 
static analysis into their dynamic equivalent could, in principle, be used, some others such as the popular 
Dynamic Amplification Factor approach, whilst appealingly simple in concept and application, have been 
shown (Izzuddin and Nethercot 2009) to produce inconsistent results. Whilst not the only possible procedure, 
the Imperial College Robustness Assessment Framework, whether it is implemented using the explicit 
spreadsheet approach or by employing suitable analysis software, does meet all the requirements and is 
available in a comprehensive form. 
 It is, therefore, contended that moving design for Robustness from its current largely prescriptive based 
approach to a performance based approach is now feasible. At least for some aspects the underlying logic and 
methodology is available. Moreover, this has been provided in a form that closely mirrors the approach used for 
design in other situations e.g. gravity and wind loading, fire design, seismic design etc. What is currently 
missing is a concerted effort to convert the research knowledge and understanding into a comprehensive design 
document, something that must involve collaboration between knowledgeable researchers and experienced 
practitioners. 
Taking this proposition a stage further, a strong case could be made for the funds awarded to the next research 
project in the area aimed at investigating one particular feature or promising an even more all embracing 
statistical framework to be used instead to produce a Performance Based design guide that would both cover 
those aspects for which sufficient is currently known and would identify exactly what would be needed to place 
areas for which some gaps in knowledge exist in a similar position. Such work is, of course, often derided as 
being insufficiently novel or not fundamental; it is, arguably, at least as intellectually challenging as 
conventional laboratory or numerical research, is actually the type of work that can only be conducted by a very 
limited number of individuals and would yield considerable benefits. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Important features of the Robustness of structures have been reviewed. It is contended that, whilst design 
provisions introduced in the aftermath of the 1968 Ronan Point collapse ensure that the situation is better than 
would be the case if no such provisions existed, the combination of expectation on the part of the public and 
understanding developed through a sustained programme of research means that better provision can and should 
now be made. Because of the nature of the subject setting this within the Performance Based concept is the 
obvious approach. Thus the profession should divert resources from traditional narrowly focussed investigative 
research projects into a concerted effort to make the best use of that which is currently available, to identify the 
important limitations that prevent every aspect from being treated in the same way as can be done for the most 
advanced and to ensure that properly focussed study of the missing items is conducted. 
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